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SCHOLIA
Croesus, Xerxes, and the Denial of 
Death (Herodotus 1.29–34; 7.44–53)*
WILLIAM N. Turpin
ABSTRACT: Herodotus portrays both Croesus and Xerxes as reso-
lutely unaware of their own mortality, despite conversations about 
the life span of an ordinary human (Croesus), and the mortality of 
his massive army (Xerxes). Part of what makes Croesus and Xerxes 
hubristic, for Herodotus, is their obliviousness to this salient aspect 
of their humanity.
Herodotus presents two complementary conversations about the human 
condition, between Croesus and Solon in book 1, and between Xerxes 
and Artabanus in book 7.1 This paper will argue that an important di-
mension has usually been overlooked by scholars: both Croesus and Xe-
rxes are reminded that death is the inevitable fate of all human beings, 
but neither king sees that he is just as mortal as everyone else.
Croesus, confi dent in his worldly happiness, raises the question of 
human happiness in general. Solon’s reply reveals a surprising, almost 
morbid, interest in death. He speaks fi rst about Tellus the Athenian, who 
concluded a rich and full life by dying for his country (1.30.3–4), and 
then about Cleobis and Biton, whose main claim to happiness was dying 
for their mother and for Hera (1.31). Croesus, however, shows no inter-
est in the way these men died, and remains focused on their status and 
wealth: Ὦ χεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, ἡ δ’ ἡμετέρη εὐδαιμονίη οὕτω τοι ἀπέρριπται 
ἐς τὸ μηδέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἰδιωτέων ἀνδρῶν ἀξίους ἡμέας ἐποίησας; (“That’s 
all very well, my Athenian friend; but what of my own happiness? Is it 
so utterly contemptible that you won’t even compare me with mere com-
mon folk like those you have mentioned?” 1.32.1).2
* I am very grateful to my colleague Rosaria Munson for her thoughtful comments.
1 For comparisons of the two episodes in general, see T. Harrison, Divinity and His-
tory: The Religion of Herodotus (Oxford 2000) 33–51. For the parallel between Croesus 
contemplating his treasures and Xerxes surveying his troops, see D. Konstan, “Persians, 
Greeks and Empire.” Arethusa 20 (1987) 68.
2 Greek is cited from the OCT of Hude; translations are from J. Marincola, ed., A. de 
Sélincourt, tr., Herodotus, The Histories (London 1996). 
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So Solon spells out what he means. Moving on from Tellus, who 
died in the prime of life, and Cleobis and Biton, who were young, Solon 
introduces a hypothetical man living out his allotted span of seventy 
years. Solon calculates, with a startling focus on the arithmetic, that 
a seventy-year-old man would have 26,250 days on which something 
could go wrong (1.32.2–4). Wealth, therefore, is no guarantee of hap-
piness, and the poor have a better chance of being happy (1.32.5–6). 
Given how much time there is for disaster to happen, you can only de-
cide that a life is happy when it is over.
Thus far, on the face of it, Solon has been focused on Croesus’ par-
ticular situation, and on the importance of death in assessing it. But 
as he continues, Solon sounds more and more as if he is talking about 
people in general, and the fact of their mortality:
εἰ δὲ πρὸς τούτοισι ἔτι τελευτήσει τὸν βίον εὖ, οὗτος ἐκεῖνος τὸν σὺ 
ζητέεις, <ὁ> ὄλβιος κεκλῆσθαι ἄξιός ἐστι· πρὶν δ’ ἂν τελεύτησῃ 
ἐπισχεῖν μηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, ἀλλ’ εὐτυχέα.
(1.32.7)
Now if a man thus favoured dies as he has lived, he will be just the 
one you are looking for: the only sort of person who deserves to be 
called happy. But mark this: until he is dead, keep the word “happy” in 
reserve. Till then he is not happy, but only lucky.
This is a clear enough reminder of human mortality, but Solon makes 
the point again:
τὰ πάντα μέν νυν ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐόντα ἀδύνατόν ἐστι, 
ὥσπερ χώρη οὐδεμία καταρκέει πάντα ἑωυτῇ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο 
μὲν ἔχει, ἑτέρου δὲ ἐπιδέεται· ἣ δὲ ἂν τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχῃ, αὕτη ἀρίστη. ὣς δὲ 
καὶ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἓν οὐδὲν αὔταρκές ἐστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλου δὲ 
ἐνδεές ἐστι. ὃς δ’ ἂν αὐτῶν πλεῖστα ἔχων διατελέῃ καὶ ἔπειτα τελευτήσῃ 
εὐχαρίστως τὸν βίον, οὗτος παρ’ ἐμοὶ τὸ οὔνομα τοῦτο, ὦ βασιλεῦ, 
δίκαιός ἐστι φέρεσθαι.
(1.32.8–9)
Nobody of course can have all these advantages, any more than a coun-
try can produce everything it needs: whatever it has, it is bound to lack 
something. The best country is the one that has the most. It is the same 
with people: no man is ever self-suffi cient—there is sure to be some-
thing missing. But whoever has the greatest number of the good things 
I have mentioned, and keeps them to the end, and dies a peaceful 
death, that man, Croesus, deserves in my opinion to be called happy.
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The principle gets extended to entire nations, which can fall victim 
to hubris as well as individuals.3 But Solon returns to the individual 
human being, and to death as the fi nal arbiter.
Solon concludes with a sweeping statement about the human con-
dition: πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεὸς προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε 
(“Often enough God gives a man a glimpse of happiness, and then ut-
terly ruins him,” 1.32.9). In theory this could be yet another comment 
on the problem of assessment, on the fact that you never know what 
is going to happen. But it is framed by a much more pointed remark 
about death in general: σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ 
ἀποβήσεται (“Look to the end, no matter what it is you are considering. 
Often enough God gives a man a glimpse of happiness, and then utterly 
ruins him,” 1.32.9). Any failure to forget the basic fact of human mor-
tality is likely to lead to disaster.
Croesus thinks Solon is a fool for insisting on this fact, and sends 
him away:
ταῦτα λέγων τῷ Κροίσῳ οὔ κως οὔτε ἐχαρίζετο, οὔτε λόγου μιν 
ποιησάμενος οὐδενὸς ἀποπέμπεται, κάρτα δόξας ἀμαθέα εἶναι, ὃς τὰ 
παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεὶς τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χρήματος ὁρᾶν ἐκέλευε.
(1.33)
These sentiments were not of the sort to give Croesus any pleasure; he 
let Solon go with cold indifference, fi rmly convinced that he was a fool. 
For what could be more stupid than to keep telling him to look to the 
“end” of everything, without regard to present prosperity?
Croesus does not understand Solon’s initial point, that “present 
prosperity” is no guarantee of future happiness. And he does not yet 
understand that “the end” is coming. He simply does not see that the fact 
of human mortality matters.
Xerxes, at Abydos, raises the question of human mortality himself, 
but like Croesus he resolutely ignores the implications.4 Surveying his 
enormous army and navy from a special throne set up at Abydos, and 
3 On this theme, see esp. C. W. Fornara, Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay (Oxford 
1971).
4 For a discussion of various translations of this passage, see S. J. Willett, “Catching 
Xerxes’ Tears in English: The Styles of Herodotean Translation,” Arion 8 (2000) 119–43.
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after enjoying a boat race, Xerxes at fi rst takes pleasure in his great good 
fortune.5 But he is soon overwhelmed with sadness:
ὡς δὲ ὥρα πάντα μὲν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὑπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀποκεκρυμμένον, 
πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀκτὰς καὶ τὰ Ἀβυδηνῶν πεδία ἐπίπλεα ἀνθρώπων, ἐνθαῦτα 
ὁ Ξέρξης ἑωυτὸν ἐμακάρισε, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐδάκρυσε.
 (7.45)
And when he saw the whole Hellespont hidden by ships, and all 
the beaches and plains of Abydos fi lled with men, he called himself 
happy—and the moment after burst into tears.
Many readers understand this response as thoughtful and compassion-
ate.6 But in my view Herodotus is presenting us with yet another ex-
ample of Xerxes’ hubris, as powerful in its way as the fl ogging of the 
Hellespont.7 Xerxes, unlike Croesus, is actually interested in the fact of 
human mortality, but only in the abstract; he fails to see the relevance 
to himself.8
5 Polycrates had already come to grief because of an excessive preoccupation with 
his possessions (Hdt. 3.41). On Xerxes’ subsequent countings of his soldiers and his ships. 
see Hdt. 7.60, with Konstan (above, n.1) 64–65.
6 Ph.-E. Legrand (Hérodote, Histoires: Livre VII [Paris 1951] 85 n.2) refers to 
“tristesse philosophique.” H. R. Immerwahr (“Historical Action in Herodotus,” TAPA 85 
(1954)) calls this “the ancient lyric sentiment that life is so short.” S. Flory (“Laughter, 
Tears and Wisdom in Herodotus,” AJP 99 [1978] 146) sees Xerxes’ initial happiness as 
“mindless and innocent.” D. Lateiner (“Tears and Crying in Hellenic Historiography: Da-
cryology from Herodotus to Polybius,” in T. Fögen, ed., Tears in the Graeco-Roman World 
[Berlin and New York 2009] 121) refers to “generous tears for human ephemerality.” E. 
Baragwanath (Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus [Oxford 2008] 266) calls Xerxes’ 
explanation “a quite profound insight.”
For the view that Herodotus is generally quite positive about Xerxes, see K. H. Wa-
ters, Herodotos on Tyrants and Despots: A Study in Objectivity (Wiesbaden 1971) 65–79; 
D. Lateiner, The Historical Method of Herodotus (Toronto 1989) 152–53; J. A. S. Evans, 
Herodotus, Explorer of the Past: Three Essays (Princeton 1991) 60–67. N. R. E. Fisher 
(Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece [Warminster 
1992] 376) says: “At times he is courteous, very ready to consult and listen to his advisers, 
generous towards friends, allies and servants, and, among his varied moods and emotions, 
there appears at times an appealing sympathy for the human condition.” Cf. Immerwahr 
(above) 176–83, which remains a persuasive account of Xerxes in Herodotus as “an ex-
treme example of the typical great ruler whose pride leads to his fall” (178).
7 On hubris and Herodotus’ account of Xerxes, see Fisher (above, n.6) 367–85. 
Fisher’s book should be read in light of D. L. Cairns, “Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking 
Big,” JHS 116 (1996) 1–32.
8 This seems to be the reading of W. C. Greene, Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek 
Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1944) 86–87, and of Harrison (above, n.1) 50: “He had been 
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Xerxes’ tunnel vision on this point is underscored by his subsequent 
conversation with Artabanus, who wants to know more about those tears:
μαθὼν δέ μιν Ἀρτάβανος ὁ πάτρως, ὃς τὸ πρῶτον γνώμην ἀπεδέξατο 
ἐλευθέρως οὐ συμβουλεύων Ξέρξῃ στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, οὗτος 
ὡνὴρ φρασθεὶς Ξέρξην δακρύσαντα εἴρετο τάδε· Ὦ βασιλεῦ, ὡς πολλὸν 
ἀλλήλων κεχωρισμένα ἐργάσαο νῦν τε καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρότερον· μακαρίσας 
γὰρ σεωυτὸν δακρύεις.
 (7.46.1)
Artabanus his uncle, the man who in the fi rst instance had spoken his 
mind so freely in trying to dissuade Xerxes from undertaking the cam-
paign, was by his side; and when he saw how Xerxes wept, he said to 
him: “My lord, surely there is a strange contradiction in what you do 
now and what you did a moment ago. Then you called yourself a happy 
man—and now you weep.”
The reappearance of Artabanus reminds us that the self-confi dence 
of Xerxes is probably unjustifi ed, given the explicit reference to his ear-
lier misgivings about the invasion. Xerxes, in his reply, reveals that what 
he has been thinking about is life, and death. But he has not been think-
ing very clearly:
ὁ δὲ εἶπε· Ἐσῆλθε γάρ με λογισάμενον κατοικτῖραι ὡς βραχὺς εἴη ὁ πᾶς 
ἀνθρώπινος βίος, εἰ τούτων γε ἐόντων τοσούτων οὐδεὶς ἐς ἑκατοστὸν ἔτος 
περιέσται.
 (7.46.2)
“I was thinking,” Xerxes replied; “and it came into my mind how piti-
fully short human life9 is—for of all these thousands of men not one 
will be alive in a hundred years’ time.”
contemplating the brevity of human life, how none of the men beneath him would be alive 
in a hundred years. He does not comment on the brevity of his own life.” See also Konstan 
(above, n.1) 64: “I should not want to take Xerxes’ pessimistic refl ection upon the brevity 
of life as the sign that he has, contrary to his customary confi dence, momentarily acquired 
a deeper insight. I should say rather that it is the entirely characteristic view of a man who 
measures time as he does power, in terms of quantity.”
9 Literally, of course, what Xerxes says is that “the whole of human life is short.” 
Though not the same as “every human life,” which would be even more pointed, the phrase 
does suggest that Xerxes is thinking of human life in the abstract, and the common inher-
itance of every human being.
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Instead of saying that “we” are all mortal, as might have been ex-
pected, Xerxes points dramatically to “all these people here” (τούτων γε 
ἐόντων τοσούτων). Life is short, and his soldiers and sailors are all going 
to die, but Xerxes sees that only as their problem.
The problem with Xerxes’ thinking is then underscored by Artabanus, 
in some breathtakingly pessimistic remarks about the human condition. 
The key assumption is that death is, indeed, a fact of life for everyone:
ὁ δὲ ἀμείβετο λέγων· Ἕτερα τούτου παρὰ τὴν ζόην πεπόνθαμεν 
οἰκτρότερα. ἐν γὰρ οὕτω βραχέϊ βίῳ οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν 
εὐδαίμων πέφυκε, οὔτε τούτων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ οὐ παραστήσεται 
πολλάκις καὶ οὐκὶ ἅπαξ τεθνάναι βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν. αἵ τε γαρ 
συμφοραὶ προσπίπτουσαι καὶ αἱ νοῦσοι συνταράσσουσαι καὶ βραχὺν 
ἐόντα μακρὸν δοκέειν εἶναι ποιεῦσι τὸν βίον. οὕτως ὁ μὲν θάνατος 
μοχθηρῆς ἐούσης τῆς ζόης καταφυγὴ αἱρετωτάτη τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γέγονε ὁ 
δὲ θεὸς γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα φθονερὸς ἐν αὐτῷ εὑρίσκεται ἐών.
 (7.46.2–4)
“Yet,” said Artabanus, “we suffer sadder things in life even than that. 
Short as it is, there is not a man in the world, either here or else-
where, who is happy enough not to wish—not once only, but again 
and again—to be dead rather than alive. Troubles come, diseases affl ict 
us; and this makes life, despite its brevity, seem all too long. So heavy 
is the burden of it that death is a refuge which we all desire, and it is 
common proof amongst us that God who gave us a taste of this world’s 
sweetness has been jealous in his giving.”
Readers have little diffi culty in seeing an allusion to Xerxes’ impending 
disasters, but we notice also that Artabanus, unlike Xerxes, is acutely 
aware that death is universal. Artabanus tries hard to make Xerxes realize 
that he’s no different from anyone else, telling him that “we all suffer” 
(πεπόνθαμεν, 7.46.2). He knows perfectly well that the host of soldiers 
and sailors are not the only mortals present at Abydos: the wish to be dead 
will occur to them, and to others (οὔτε τούτων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, 7.46.3).
Xerxes says that he agrees with Artabanus, but he is not really looking 
at things in the same way. He simply wants to bring the conversation to an 
end, and pointedly refuses to think about what Artabanus has actually said:
Ξέρξης δὲ ἀμείβετο λέγων· Ἀρτάβανε, βιοτῆς μέν νυν ἀνθρωπηίης πέρι, 
ἐούσης τοιαύτης οἵην περ σὺ διαιρέαι εἶναι, παυσώμεθα, μηδὲ κακῶν 
μεμνώμεθα χρηστὰ ἔχοντες πρήγματα ἐν χερσί.
(7.47.1)
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“Artabanus,” Xerxes replied, “the lot of men here upon earth is indeed 
as you have described it; but let us put aside these gloomy refl ections, 
for we have pleasant things at hand.”
Here de Sélincourt’s translation is a little misleading. Xerxes dismisses 
not “gloomy refl ections” but “evil things” more generally.10 These surely 
include death. Having been invited to refl ect on mortality, his own as 
well as everyone else’s, Xerxes simply refuses to listen.
Ernest Becker, in his Denial of Death, famously argued that human 
psychology is dominated by the unwillingness to accept mortality.11 And 
while Herodotus was of course less psychological in his approach to the 
human condition, he anticipated Becker’s brilliant insight in his own 
way. Herodotus certainly did not see an unwillingness to face death as 
a part of the human condition in general. Like all Greeks he knew that 
only the gods were immortal,12 and that for humans life is short and its 
pleasures fl eeting. He also knew that some people could forget this, and 
that that was a bad sign: the denial of death was hubris.13
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE
wturpin1@swarthmore.edu
10 Thus R. Waterfi eld (Herodotus: The Histories [Oxford,1998)] translates: “We 
shouldn’t talk about bad things when involved in good things like our current project.”
11 E. Becker, The Denial of Death (New York 1973).
12 M. P. Nilsson (A History of Greek Religion [New York 1964] 157) states: “The 
immortality of the gods drew a clear line of demarcation which man could not pass. In 
other respects no such line exists. The gods are stronger, wiser, more powerful than men, 
but this is merely a question of degree.” See also J.-P. Vernant, “Mortals and Immortals: 
The Body of the Divine,” in F. I. Zeitlin, ed., Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays 
(Princeton,1991) 27–49. See Hdt. 2.78 for the Egyptians and memento mori. 
13 See also Pi. I. 5.16: θνατὰ θνατοσι πρέπει.; Pi. O. 1.59–65; Aesch. PV 82–87; 
545–551; Ag. 1022–1024; Eur. Alc. 123–129. 
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